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1. Introduction 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) focus on providing credit to the poor who have no access to 
commercial banks, in order to reduce poverty and to help the poor with setting up their own 
income generating businesses. In the literature, this focus is generally described as outreach. 
Because providing credit to the poor in many cases is a very costly activity, MFIs are often 
loss making, i.e they are not financially sustainable. Yet, in many cases MFIs succeed in 
lending to domestic small companies and poor agents, because Western donors and NGOs 
provide financial support by offering them loans against below-market interest rates.  
Recently, however, there seems to be a shift from subsidizing MFIs institutions to a 
focus on financial sustainability and efficiency of these institutions. This goal stresses the 
importance of being able to cover the cost of lending money out of the income generated from 
the outstanding loan portfolio and to reduce these costs as much as possible. Among other 
things, this increased focus on financial sustainability and efficiency is due to a number of  
developments the microfinance business has been recently confronted with, such as the 
increasing competition among MFIs, the commercialization of microfinance (i.e. the interest 
of commercial banks and investors to finance MFIs), technological change that also has 
become available for, and implemented in microfinance, and financial liberalization and 
regulation policies of the government (Rhyne and Otero, 2006). These developments have 
induced microfinance institutions to change their behavior, and to broaden their services and 
activities.  
The question that pops up is whether and to what extent shifting the focus towards 
increased financial sustainability and efficiency has implications for the outreach of MFIs. On 
the one hand, the commercialization of microfinance may attract increased commercial funds, 
which may contribute to supporting the outreach goal of MFIs. They may enlarge the amount 
of loans to the poor and/or ensure the provision of such loans for a longer period of time. 
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Thus, the absolute number of poor people that have access to MFIs may be increased. 
Moreover, increased competition, technological change, and financial market policies, which 
focus on strengthening market forces and improving the stability of MFIs, may positively 
contribute to the efficiency of MFIs. This, in turn, may help generating more financial 
resources with which the poor can be helped. Under these circumstances, outreach and 
financial sustainability and efficiency seem to be compatible objectives. Yet, focussing on 
financial sustainability and efficiency may also go at the cost of lending to the poor. As 
lending money to the poor – especially the very poor and/or the rural poor – can be very 
costly, the outreach and sustainability goal may be conflicting. Especially in policy circles 
there is a hefty debate on the compatibility versus the trade-off between sustainability and 
outreach. Whereas the so-called welfarist view stresses the importance of outreach and the 
threat of focusing too much on sustainability, the institutionalist view claims that MFIs should 
focus on sustainability.  
While from a policy perspective it is very important to know whether the strife for 
financial sustainability and efficiency is compatible or conflicting with the outreach goal, 
there are surprisingly few studies that have investigated this issue in a systematic and 
appropriate way. Most studies only provide anecdotal evidence. This study aims at 
contributing to closing this gap in the literature. In particular, we provide an indepth analysis 
of the potential compatibility or trade-off between effciency of MFIs and their outreach. We 
use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), a technique that has not been used extensively in the 
field of microfinance, to measure the efficiency of individual MFIs. We then link the 
efficiency measures obtained from the SFA to measures of outreach. For the analysis we use 
data for 435 MFIs, which we obtained from MixMarketTM over the period 1997-2007. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature 
on the relationship between financial sustainability, efficiency and outreach of MFIs. In 
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section 3 we set out the research methodology and explain the SFA in some detail. Section 4 
continues with a description of the dataset, after which the estimation results are presented in 
section 5. In section 6 we summarize the main findings and provide conclusions we derive 
from the analysis. 
 
2. Financial sustainability, efficiency and outreach: A short discussion of the literature 
Recently, MFIs have been confronted with a number of challenges that has affected their way 
of doing business.1 First, in several countries competition among MFIs has increased rapidly.  
This has led to lower interest rates, lower costs, more efficiency, and the introduction of new 
financial services, such as saving accounts, insurance services, etc. Second, commercial banks 
have started to become interested in providing microfinance, since in the past MFIs have 
shown that this can be a successful and profitable business. K-REP in Kenya is an example of 
a commercial bank that is involved in lending to the poor. Moreover, in some countries the 
government has actively stimulated commercial banks to become involved in microfinance.2 
Again, this has put pressure on MFIs to reduce interest rates and costs and raise efficiency.  
Third, commercial banks and investors, especially those from developed countries, 
have become increasingly interested in financing MFIs. Large banks such as Citigroup, 
Deutsche Bank and HSBC, for example, have separate microfinance divisions, supporting 
activities of MFIs. The interest of multinational banks is due to the so-called “double bottom 
line” of financing and supporting MFIs: it allows banks and investors to show their corporate 
social responsibility, while at the same time these investments provide attractive risk-return 
profiles (Deutsche Bank Research, 2007). The first example of commercial capitalization of 
MFIs was the creation of an investment fund called Profund in 1995, which raised $23 million 
                                                 
1
 This section is partly based on Rhyne and Otero (2006). 
2
 In Malaysia, Nepal and Thailand, for instance, the government has initiated programs stimulating commercial 
banks to develop microfinance activities. In India the National Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(NABARD) recently initiated a program to involve private banks in microfinance.  
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to finance Latin American MFIs. In 2006 private investment funds, also known as 
microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs), held portfolios of MFIs shares with a total value of 
$2.3 billion (CGAP, 2007). Yet, the increased interest from commercial players has also 
raised the need for MFIs to become financially sustainable and enhance their efficiency.  
Moreover, two additional recent developments have helped MFIs to improve their 
sustainability and efficiency. First, new banking technology, such as charge cards, ATMs, the 
use of cell phones and the internet has begun to enter the microfinance business, helping to 
reduce costs and improve the delivery of services. Second, several developing countries have 
recently liberalized financial markets, while at the same time installing regulations to help 
improving the stability of the microfinance business. These changes of financial market 
policies may also contribute to improving the sustainability and efficiency of microfinance. 
The above developments and the resulting emphasis on sustainability and efficiency of 
MFIs may go at the cost of their outreach, however. Reaching the poor and providing them 
with credit may be very costly. Making very small loans involves high transaction costs, in 
terms of screening, monitoring and administration costs, per loan. Several authors therefore 
argue that the unit transaction costs for small loans to the poor are high as compared to unit 
costs of larger loans (Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Conning, 1999; Paxton and Cuevas, 2002; 
Lapenu and Zeller, 2002). Thus, there may be a trade-off between efficiency and outreach, 
implying that the shifting focus towards increasing sustainability and efficiency reduces the 
scope for the more traditional aim of many MFIs, which is lending to the poor. 
What is the evidence on this trade-off between efficiency and outreach? In policy 
circles there has been a hefty debate on this issue between the welfarists, who propagate the 
dominance of the outreach goal (Woller, 2002; Montgomery and Weiss, 2005; Hashemi and 
Rosenberg, 2006), and the institutionalists, who stress the importance of sustainability and 
efficiency (Rhyne, 1998; Christen, 2001; Isern and Porteous, 2006). Both camps provide (in 
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many cases mostly anecdotal) evidence to support their view. Recently, however, 
representatives from both camps seem to have moved towards the centre, concluding that, 
under certain conditions, sustainability and outreach may be compatible (Morduch, 2005).  
In the academic literature, however, we find surprisingly few rigorous testing of this 
issue. The most comprehensive study is from Cull et al. (2007). They examine the financial 
performance (using measures of profitability) and outreach in a large comparative study, 
based on a new and extensive data set of 124 MFIs in 49 countries. The study suggests that 
MFIs that focus on providing loans to individuals perform better in terms of profitability. Yet, 
the fraction of poor borrowers and female borrowers in the loan portfolio of these MFIs is 
lower than for MFIs that focus on lending to groups. It also suggests that individual-based 
MFIs, especially if they grow larger, focus increasingly on wealthier clients, a phenomenon 
termed as “mission drift”. This mission drift does not occur as strongly for the group-based 
MFIs. Thus, Cull et al. do find evidence for a trade-off between efficiency and outreach. 
Cull et al. (2007) support the findings of earlier studies, which, however, used less 
rigorous techniques and/or smaller datasets. Olivares-Polanco (2005) investigates the 
determinants of outreach in terms of the loan size of MFIs, using data for 28 MFIs in Latin 
America for the years 1999-2001. The analysis includes only one observation for each MFI in 
the dataset. Using simple OLS, Olivares-Polanco’s study confirms the existence of a trade-off 
between sustainability and outreach. Makame and Murinde (2006) analyze the outreach 
versus sustainability trade-off using a balanced panel dataset for 33 MFIs in five East African 
countries for the period 2000-2005. Using different measures of the depth (loan size) and 
breadth (number of borrowers) of outreach, they find strong evidence for a trade-off between 
outreach and sustainability and efficiency.  
Navajas et al. (2003) do not directly analyze the existence of the trade-off, but their 
study may have implications for outreach versus sustainability. They discuss the Bolivian 
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microfinance market developments since the mid-1990s and show that due to increased 
competition MFIs changed their lending technologies and the borrowers on which they focus 
their activities. In particular, their discussion suggests that the new competitor in the market 
(in Bolivia, this was Caja Los Andes) offered loan contracts that attracted less poor and more 
productive borrowers. Consequently, the first mover in the microfinance market (Bancosol) 
had to adjust its lending policies and, according to Navajas et al. (2003), it switched to loan 
contracts that prevented the less poor, more productive borrowers to move to Caja Los Andes. 
Implicitly, this suggests that competition leads to less access to credit for the poorest, i.e. less 
outreach. In a related paper, McIntosh et al. (2005) focus on the effects of increased 
competition in microfinance. In their study, they empirically show that wealthier borrowers 
are likely to benefit from increasing competition among microfinance institutions, but that it 
leads to lower levels of welfare for the poorer borrowers. This seems to support the view that 
outreach is hurt by the pressure of competition on the business of microfinance. 
A related issue is that of financial regulation. It has been argued that regulation of 
microfinance is necessary, just like it is for commercial banks, due to the existence of 
information asymmetry (Hardy et al., 2003; Marulanda and Otero, 2005). Yet, regulation may 
divert attention away from outreach, if regulatory requirements focus too much on financial 
goals such as capital adequacy, financial sustainability, etc. Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007), 
using data for 114 MFIs from 62 countries specifically investigate the impact of regulation on 
the performance of MFIs. In general terms, they do not find any evidence that regulated MFIs 
perform better in terms of either sustainability of outreach as compared to non-regulated 
MFIs, a finding that is consistent to what has been found for banks in general (Barth et al,. 
2004). Thus, changes in financial market regulation do not seem to have an impact on the 
compatibility or trade-off between the two goals of MFIs. Makame and Murinde (2006), 
however, do find evidence for a negative relationship between regulation and outreach. 
 8 
To conclude, the above review shows that there is only limited empirical evidence on 
the compatibility or trade-off between sustainability and outreach of MFIs. The few studies 
available suggest that there is a trade-off, yet they mostly use small datasets and/or simple 
analyses, except for Cull et al. (2007). Our study aims at going beyond the existing empirical 
analyses in two important ways. First, we use a substantially larger dataset, containing 
information for a large number of MFIs over a longer period of time than any of the previous 
studies in this field. Secondly, we use different measures of sustainability. In particular, we 
look at the cost efficiency of microfinance institutions. In order to do this, we formulate a cost 
function, apply stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to determine a cost frontier, and determine 




In our analysis we measure cost efficiency in terms of how close the actual costs of the 
lending activities of an MFI are to what the costs of a best-practice MFI would have been in 
case it produces identical output under the same conditions. Cost efficiency measures the 
reduction in cost that could have been achieved if an MFI were both allocatively and 
technically efficient. As cost functions are not directly observable, inefficiencies are measured 
in comparison with an efficient cost frontier. Most studies on cost efficiency use data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) or stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to calculate this frontier. 
We use SFA, since it controls for measurement errors and other random effects.3 More 
specifically, we use the SFA suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995), henceforth the BC 
model. A first advantage of the BC model as compared to the standard two-step SFA of 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) is that the BC 
                                                 
3
 Non-parametric techniques do not allow for measurement error and luck factors. These techniques attribute any 
deviation from the best-practice MFI to technical inefficiency. For a more extensive review of the non-
parametric and the parametric approach, see Matousek and Taci (2004).   
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model simultaneously estimates the cost frontier and the coefficients of the efficiency 
variables. Wang and Schmidt (2002) show that a two-step approach suffers from the 
assumption that the efficiency term is independent and identically truncated, normally 
distributed in the first step, while in the second step the efficiency terms are assumed to be 
normally distributed and dependent on the explanatory variables. This method inherently 
renders biased coefficients. A second advantage of the BC model is that it can be estimated for 
an unbalanced panel, which normally increases the number of observations.  
The general BC model specifies a stochastic cost frontier with the following properties: 
 
(1) titititititi vuqwyCC ,,,,,, );,,(ln ++= β  
 
where Ci,t is the total cost MFI i faces at time t and );,( ,, βtiti wyC  is the cost frontier. In this cost 
frontier, tiy ,  represents the logarithm of output of MFI i at time t, tiw , is a vector of the 
logarithm of input prices of MFI i at time t, q are MFI specific control variables and β is a 
vector of all parameters to be estimated. The term ui,t captures cost inefficiency and is 
independent and identically distributed with a truncated normal distribution4. vi,t captures 
measurement errors and random effects, e.g. good and bad luck, and is distributed as a standard 
normal variable. Both ui,t and vi,t  are time and MFI specific and can be represented as:  
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Next, we model the inefficiency of an MFI as: 
                                                 
4
 Thus, the total costs a MFI faces are never lower than the costs of the frontier. For a graphical representation of 
the frontier and its dynamics, see Berger et al. (1993). The authors show how inefficiency is determined by both 
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In equation (4), the z represents the vector of n variables that determine the inefficiency (m) of 
MFI i at time t. The deltas represent the coefficients. Equations (1) and (4) are solved in one 
step by using maximum likelihood. 
For the specification of the cost function we use the model developed by Sealey and 
Lindley (1977), who state that a bank acts as an intermediate between funders and borrowers. 
The cost function has a translog specification, and can be specified as follows: 
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In equation (5) TC represents total costs a MFI faces, SALARY represents the price of one 
factor of labor for one year, R is the interest expenses of holding money, GLP is the gross 
loan portfolio, and MFITYPE refers to the type of MFI. TC is measured as the total expenses 
to total assets ratio times total assets in US dollars. SALARY is the operating expenses to total 
assets ratio times total assets in US dollars, divided by the total number of employees. R is the 
financial expenses to total assets ratio divided by the total deposits to total assets. GLP is the 
gross loan portfolio to total assets ratio times total assets in US dollars.5 In the cost function in 
                                                 
5
 Data for TC, SALARY, R and GLP are not directly available from the dataset we have used for this study 
(MixMarketTM; see section 4 for a description of this source). Instead, information in terms of ratios, such as 
total costs to total assets, etc. are given only. This is why we have multiplied these ratios with total assets to 
obtain data for TC, SALARY, R and GLP.  
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equation (5), SALARY and R are the inputs, while GLP represents total output. The cost 
function specification takes into account the individual input and output variables, the square 
of these variables, as well as combinations of these variables. All variables in equation (5) are 
taken in logs. 
In order to control for the fact that different types of MFIs may have different cost 
functions, we add a vector of dummies for the type of MFI (MFITYPE). In particular, cost 
functions may differ between types of MFI due to differences in the levels of subsidies these 
institutions receive from outside. The data we use (discussed in more detail below) do not 
provide detailed information about subsidies received, which stresses the need for adding 
controls for MFI type.6 In the estimation outcomes discussed below we report the results for 
the specific dummy variables we have created for the type of MFI. In particular, we have 
dummy variables for banks (BANK), cooperatives (COOP), non-bank financial institutions 
(NONBANK) non-governmental organizations (NGO), rural banks (RURBANK) and other 
organizations (OTHER). The dummy variable OTHER is left out of the empirical analysis for 
reasons of singularity. Finally, loan loss reserves (LLR) are included to control for differences 
in the risk taking strategies among MFIs (Fries and Taci, 2005). 
As mentioned before, the central aim of the paper is to investigate the trade-off (or 
compatibility) between sustainability and efficiency versus outreach of MFIs. In the 
framework we use, mi,t is our measure of inefficiency of an MFI. To analyze the relationship 
between efficiency and outreach we specify an empirical model, in which the inefficiency 
variable is the dependent variable and in which we have a number of measures of outreach. 
Additionally, we include a number of control variables that may also influence the 
inefficiency of MFIs.  
The general specification of the inefficiency equations we estimate is as follows: 
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In this equation m stands for the first moment of the inefficiency distribution for MFI i at time 
t. The higher this moment, the more likely it is that the MFI is inefficient. The first two 
variables in this equation are standard measures of outreach; they have also been used in other 
studies. These variables are central to our analysis. ALB is the log of the average loan balance 
per borrower (in US dollars). Higher values of ALB indicate less depth of outreach, since in 
this case the MFI is expected to provide fewer loans to poor borrowers. WOMAN denotes the 
percentage of female borrowers in the total loan portfolio of the MFI. Higher values for this 
measure indicate more depth of outreach, since lending to women is associated with lending 
to poor borrowers. 
Before developing our expectations with respect to the trade-off between outreach to 
the poor and efficiency of an MFI, we want to stress once again that the dependent variable of 
equation (6) measures the extent to which an MFI is considered to be inefficient. This means 
that we expect that for the outreach variable WOMAN the coefficient will be significantly 
positive. For the outreach variable ALB the expected coefficient will be significantly negative. 
The remaining variables in equation (6) are control variables. LOANTYPE is a vector 
of dummy variables indicating which type of loans an MFI mainly provides. The inefficiency 
of an MFI may depend on the type of loans it mainly provides. From the literature we know 
that some types of loans demand more efforts than other ones. We have four different 
dummies, indicating that the MFI mainly provides individual loans (INDIV), group loans 
(GROUP), village loans (VILLAGE), and individual, group and village loans (ALLTYPE). The 
group of MFIs not included in one of the four dummies consists of those institutions that do 
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not report their main lending type. This group of MFIs is left out of the empirical analysis for 
reasons of singularity. 
YEAR is a time running from 1 to 11. This variable is added to control for the 
possibility that inefficiency effects may change over time. AGE is a measure of the age of the 
MFI, i.e. the number of years since its establishment. Adding this variable allows for the 
possibility to test the hypothesis that older, more experienced MFIs are more efficient. An 
alternative hypothesis, however, may be that older institutions have had to learn how to cope 
with microfinance practices by trial and error, whereas more recently established institutions 
may profit from the knowledge with respect to microfinance practices that has been built-up 
during the past few decades. In other words, new MFIs may leapfrog older institutions in 
terms of the efficiency of their activities. If the first hypothesis holds, the coefficient for AGE 
is negative and significant, whereas in the second case the coefficient will be positive7.  
 
4. Data 
The data on MFIs are taken from MixMarketTM, a global web-based microfinance information 
platform. After adjustments for missing data we have information for 435 MFIs over a period 
of 11 years (1997-2007). Our full sample consists of 1,318 observations. Appendix table A 
provides the correlation matrix of the variables used in the analysis. Table 1 describes the 
dataset in terms of the number of MFIs per year for which we have information. As can be 
seen from table 1A we have only 6 observations for 1997 and 13 for 2007. In between these 
two years, the number of observations increases from 19 in 1998 to 298 in 2006. Table 1B 
shows the number of observations per MFI. For almost 50 per cent of all MFIs in our dataset, 
                                                 
7
 We also included size effects (measured as the number of active borrowers to which the MFI provides loans) 
and regional effects (by including regional dummies for African, and East Asian and Pacific countries) in the 
original empirical specification of the inefficiency equation. Yet, in the empirical analysis these variables turned 
out not to be statistically significant, which is why we have excluded them from the discussion in the main text 
of the paper. The results of these regressions are available on request from the authors. 
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we have only one or two observations. Moreover, there is not a single MFI for which we have 
data for entire 1997-2007 period.  
 
<Insert tables 1A and 1B here> 
 
Table 2 provides information on which loan type is used most often by MFIs in 
different country regions. The information is taken from the Mix Microbanking Bulletin, 
which makes a distinction between individual lending, group or solidarity lending, village 
bank lending and mixed lending (which means that an MFI does not focus on using either one 
of the three types of lending).8 The table shows that especially the Latin American MFIs in 
our sample mainly provide individual loans, whereas for African MFIs group lending is 
relatively more important.  
 
<Insert table 2 here> 
 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics with respect to loan types and different 
measures of outreach. The table suggests that MFIs that focus on group lending and village 
banking are associated more with lending to the poor than MFI focusing on individual 
lending. For instance, the average loan balance per borrower is much lower for MFIs 
focussing on group lending and village lending as compared to MFIs, which focus on 
individual lending. In addition, the percentage of female borrowers is higher for MFIs 
focussing on group and village lending as compared to those MFIs that mainly lend on an 
individual basis. Finally, the percentage of clients below the poverty line is higher for MFIs 
                                                 
8
 Note that for several MFIs in our dataset information on the loan type is not available, which also why the sum 
of the rows do not add up to the total amount reported in the last column of table 2. 
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that mainly use group and village lending as compared to MFIs focusing on individual 
lending.9 
 
<Insert table 3 here> 
 
5. Estimation strategy and results 
Table 4 provides the estimation results with respect to the relationship between outreach and 
efficiency. The procedure we have used to generate these results is carried out as follows. As 
was mentioned before, the approach we follow (i.e. the SFA proposed by Battese and Coelli 
(1995)) simultaneously estimates the cost frontier and the inefficiency equation. With respect 
to the cost function we always estimate using the full specification of equation (5). This 
strategy is followed, since our main focus is not on the specification of the cost frontier, but 
on the specification of the inefficiency equation, and on the trade-off between outreach and 
efficiency in particular. 
With respect to the inefficiency equation (6) we follow a specific-to-general approach 
(Brooks, 2002). This allows us to explicitly investigate the sensitivity of the results regarding 
the trade-off between outreach and efficiency to different specifications of the inefficiency 
equation. We start the analysis by including the two outreach variables in the inefficiency 
equation separately. We then include both outreach variables together in one regression. In 
table 4, the results for these three different specifications are presented in columns [1] to [3]. 
These three specifications are the ones on which our analysis is primarily focused.  
Next, we add different sets of the control variables, which we have discussed above, to 
the three specifications of columns [1] to [3]. These extended specifications are presented in 
                                                 
9
 Unfortunately, for three of the six measures of outreach presented in the table, we have insufficient information 
in our dataset, which is why we only carry out the analysis with the outreach variables ALB and WOMAN. The 
average savings balance per saver is sometimes used as a measure of outreach. Yet, we have not used this 
measure in our analysis, since not all MFIs are allowed to offer savings accounts due to legal restrictions. Using 
this measure would therefore, at potentially, result in biased outcomes.  
 16 
columns [4] to [6]. Since our data have a panel structure, all estimations have been carried out 
using pooled regressions. 
 
<Insert table 4 here> 
 
Panel A of table 4 refers to the estimation results of the cost frontier. A positive 
coefficient implies an outward shift of the cost function, and hence – ceteris-paribus – higher 
costs. The estimation results for the cost function appear to be as expected in most cases: the 
coefficients for SALARY and GLP are always significant and positive. The coefficient for R is 
negative, which is not as expected. Yet, several of the interaction and quadratic terms are 
significant as well and some of them are positive, which makes it difficult to directly observe 
the marginal effect of R on total costs. We use the so-called delta method to calculate the 
average marginal effect of R on total costs.10 The calculations show that the marginal effect is 
significant and positive.11 This leads us to conclude that our specification of the cost frontier 
fits theory reasonably well. Finally, all dummy variables for the type of MFIs, as well as the 
risk variable LLR are statistically significant in all specifications in table 4, indicating that the 
type of MFI and the  risk taking strategy of an MFI indeed affect the cost frontier. 
Panel B of table 4 refers to the estimation of the inefficiency equation. The results in 
columns [1] through [3] suggest that there is rather strong evidence for a trade-off between 
outreach to the poor and efficiency of MFIs. In all equations, the coefficient for ALB is 
negative and highly significant. This suggests that MFIs with lower average loan balances 
(i.e. those that focus more on lending to the poor) are less efficient. In addition, the results 
indicate that MFIs that focus more on female borrowers are less efficient, since the coefficient 
for WOMAN is positive and significant.  
                                                 
10
 The delta method is available in STATA®; see also Oehlert (1992) for a specification of this method. 
11
 For completeness, we also calculated the marginal effects of SALARY and GLP on total costs with the help of 
the delta method. The results show also for these two variables the marginal effect is significant and positive. 
 17 
The results for the outreach variables do not change when we include different sets of 
control variables. The coefficient for ALB remains to be negative and highly significant in all 
specifications presented in columns [4] through [6]. Also for WOMAN the results remain the 
same given different specifications.12 
 With respect to the results for the control variables panel B of table 4 shows the 
following.13 First, the variable YEAR is always negative and statistically significant, indicating 
that during recent years MFIs in general have become more efficient. This may be explained 
by a learning curve effect: due to the strong growth of the microfinance business worldwide, 
knowledge has increased and has spilled-over, and people have become more experienced in 
managing MFI activities. Second, of the loan type dummies included in the analysis GROUP 
and ALLTYPE always have a negative and significant coefficient (see columns [5] and [6]), 
indicating that MFI focusing on group lending and/or on combining group, individual and 
village lending are more efficient. Especially the results with respect to GROUP are 
interesting, since they are not line with what has been found elsewhere in the literature. Our 
results indicate that group lending practices are generally less costly, supporting the view that 
this lending technique helps reducing information costs related to lending to the poor more 
than other lending techniques do. Third, the coefficient for the variable AGE is positive and 
significant, indicating that older MFIs are less efficient (see column [6]). This supports the 
view that more recently established institutions profit from the knowledge with respect to 
microfinance practices that has been built-up during the past few decades. Based on the 
existing knowledge base new MFIs may leapfrog older institutions in terms of the efficiency 
of their activities.  
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 These results also hold for specifications of the model including size and region effects (i.e. control variables 
that were not significant; see footnote 7). 
13
 We also included the dummies for the type of MFI in the inefficiency equation (the estimation results are 
available from the authors on request). The results show that if we do this these dummy variables are all 
insignificant. We also find this result if we include the dummies in the inefficiency equation, but leave them out 
of the cost frontier estimations. These results clearly indicate that the type of MFI is primarily relevant for the 
cost frontier, while there is no indication that it is a relevant issue for explaining differences in inefficiency 
between different MFIs. 
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 Summarizing the results in table 4, we find support for the fact that there is a trade-off 
between outreach and efficiency of MFIs in our sample. These findings remain to be 
significant even after controlling for a large set of control variables. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has used SFA to examine whether there is a trade-off between outreach to the poor 
and efficiency of MFIs. Using a sample of more than 1,300 observations, we find convincing 
evidence that outreach is negatively related to efficiency of MFIs. More specifically, we find 
that MFIs that have lower average loan balances, which is a measure of the depth of outreach, 
are also less efficient. Moreover, we find evidence showing that MFIs that have more women 
borrowers as clients – again a measure of the depth of outreach – are less efficient. These 
results remain robustly significant after having added a long list of control variables. 
In view of the current move to commercialization of the microfinance industry this 
appears to be bad news. Commercialization may induce a stronger emphasis on efficiency. 
Our study suggests that improving efficiency may only be achieved if MFIs focus less on the 
poor. It should be noted, however, that our results do not necessarily imply that a stronger 
focus on efficiency is bad for poverty reduction. As Zeller and Johanssen (2006) have pointed 
out, due to spill-over effects MFIs that strive for efficiency, and score low on outreach to the 
poor, may ultimately cause a higher poverty reduction at the macro level than MFIs that score 
high on outreach indicators. This assumes that these efficient MFIs are able to contribute to 
improving economic conditions at the local, regional and country level, and that these 
contributions ultimately are higher than the contributions to poverty alleviation made by MFI 
concentrating on outreach rather than efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, until now no 
study has empirically investigated the existence (let alone the size) of the effects of increased 
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efficiency of MFIs at the regional or macro (country) level. Further research is needed to look 
into this issue more carefully.  
 One final note with respect to the current process of commercialization of 
microfinance is that commercialization does not necessarily mean more focus on efficiency. 
Commercial parties may have different aims when investing in MFI, for example, since they 
aim at helping the poor as part of their corporate social responsible behavior. Moreover, they 
may be interested in investing in MFIs as part of an investment strategy that focuses on risk 
diversification rather than profit maximization at the level of individual MFIs. If investors are 
seeking to diversify their portfolios they are not necessarily interested in the most efficient 
MFIs. Again, further research is needed to get a better knowledge of the exact reasons why 
commercial parties are involved in microfinance and how this affects the efficiency and 
outreach of MFIs. 
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Table 1A: Description of the panel (MFIs per year) 
















Table 1B: Description of the panel (Number of year observations per MFIs) 

















Table 2: Loan type and country region 
Region Loan type 
 Individual Mixed Solidarity Village Total 
      
Africa 29 87 51 3 170 
East Asia and the 
Pacific 49 40 3 1 93 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 7 13 3 0 23 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 99 22 0 0 121 
South Asia 0 40 7 10 57 
      




Table 3: Descriptive statistics of outreach measures per loan type 
 
 
Individual Mixed Group Village Total 
Average loan balance 
per borrower (ALB) Mean 1,132 567 115 85 715 
 
St. dev. 904 791 46 38 858 
 
Obs. 184 202 64 14 464 
 
 
     
% loans below US$300 Mean 54 67 94 95 71 
 
St. dev. 21 31 12 7 29 
 
Obs. 23 42 11 10 86 
 
 
     
% woman borrowers Mean 43 64 65 97 58 
(WOMAN) St. dev. 24 26 24 5 27 
 
Obs. 138 168 60 14 380 
 
 
     
Average savings 
balance per saver(US$) Mean 1,892 2,332 37 22 1,751 
(ASB) St. dev. 10,415 26,409 60 32 18,412 
 
Obs. 172 183 62 14 431 
 
      
% clients below poverty 
line Mean 29 55 75 68 57 
 
St. dev. 33 24 50 44 34 
 
Obs. 5 22 4 9 40 
 
 
     
% clients in bottom half 
of the population Mean 12 13 0 50 17 
 
St. dev. 16 6 – 0.5 15 
 
Obs. 5 21 1 4 31 
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Table 4: Results of the estimations 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Panel A 
SALARY 2.154*** 2.184*** 2.227*** 2.216*** 2.211*** 2.091*** 
 (0.189) (0.222) (0.213) (0.213) (0.209) (0.212) 
R -0.188*** -0.212** -0.283*** -0.267*** -0.260*** -0.268*** 
 (0.071) (0.087) (0.081) (0.082) (0.081) (0.081) 
GLP 0.329*** 0.334*** 0.311*** 0.313*** 0.377*** 0.420*** 
 (0.073) (0.090) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) 
SALARY*R 0.018** 0.021** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
R*GLP 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
SALARY*GLP -0.016** -0.016* -0.008 -0.007 -0.01 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
SALARY2 -0.085*** -0.092*** -0.096*** -0.096*** -0.094*** -0.092*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
GLP2 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
R2 0 0.001 0 0.001 0 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
BANK -0.405*** -0.368** -0.476*** -0.438*** -0.420*** -0.416*** 
 (0.147) (0.162) (0.160) (0.158) (0.160) (0.160) 
COOP -0.897*** -0.885*** -0.939*** -0.887*** -0.899*** -0.922*** 
 (0.145) (0.160) (0.158) (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) 
NONBANK -0.652*** -0.557*** -0.716*** -0.669*** -0.650*** -0.657*** 
 (0.147) (0.160) (0.161) (0.159) (0.161) (0.161) 
NGO -0.629*** -0.540*** -0.724*** -0.667*** -0.692*** -0.714*** 
 (0.149) (0.164) (0.162) (0.162) (0.163) (0.163) 
RURBANK -0.879*** -0.879*** -0.939*** -0.882*** -0.930*** -0.982*** 
 (0.148) (0.164) (0.163) (0.163) (0.164) (0.165) 
LLR 0.199*** 0.197*** 0.191*** 0.188*** 0.185*** 0.183*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Constant -7.227*** -6.871*** -7.572*** -7.579*** -7.945*** -7.644*** 
 (0.887) (1.133) (1.066) (1.063) (1.059) (1.057) 
Panel B 
ALB -0.196***  -0.162*** -0.159*** -0.169*** -0.170*** 
 (0.017)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
WOMAN  0.394*** 0.227*** 0.228*** 0.231*** 0.228*** 
  (0.074) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
YEAR    -0.015** -0.013* -0.013* 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
INDIVIDUAL     0.084* 0.051 
     (0.044) (0.046) 
GROUP     -0.209*** -0.200*** 
     (0.063) (0.064) 
VILLAGE     0.254** 0.251** 
     (0.126) (0.126) 
ALLTYPE     -0.090** -0.083* 
     (0.042) (0.042) 
AGE      0.004*** 
      (0.001) 
Constant 1.915*** 0.459* 1.751*** 31.880** 26.880* 28.564* 
 (0.114) (0.269) (0.178) (14.559) (14.942) (14.988) 
Obs. 1237 1004 1004 1004 1004 1004 
Standard errors in bracelets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Appendix table A: Correlation table 
 TC R SALARY GLP BANK COOP NONBANK NGO RURAL Other ALB (in $) year WOMAN INDIVIDUAL ALLTYPE
                
TC 1               
R 0.0902 1              
SALARY 0.5654 -0.1296 1             
GLP 0.9602 0.0898 0.4943 1            
BANK 0.4798 0.0404 0.2996 0.4415 1           
COOP -0.3278 -0.3147 0.0177 -0.2771 -0.2812 1          
NONBANK 0.113 0.0938 0.0141 0.103 -0.268 -0.4159 1         
NGO -0.1094 0.2112 -0.2339 -0.1444 -0.1922 -0.2982 -0.2842 1        
RURAL -0.1369 0.0338 -0.1215 -0.1018 -0.1278 -0.1983 -0.189 -0.1355 1       
Other 0.0679 -0.0073 -0.0156 0.0493 -0.0357 -0.0553 -0.0528 -0.0378 -0.0252 1      
ALB (in $) 0.238 -0.0488 0.3462 0.2747 0.2293 0.0772 -0.0879 -0.1909 -0.0482 0.0764 1     
year 0.047 0.0631 0.0685 0.0927 -0.0811 0.06 -0.062 0.0576 0.0646 -0.1182 0.1165 1    
WOMAN -0.1274 0.2347 -0.2609 -0.1646 -0.1143 -0.1951 -0.0742 0.4698 -0.0163 -0.0882 -0.2315 0.0118 1   
INDIVIDUAL 0.2474 -0.0388 0.2144 0.2387 0.1499 -0.1191 0.0062 -0.0913 0.1268 -0.0329 0.0717 -0.1547 -0.2173 1  
ALLTYPE 0.2062 0.1434 -0.0353 0.2255 0.2065 -0.1761 0.0606 0.0434 -0.1234 -0.0372 -0.0753 -0.1054 0.0925 -0.174 
GROUP -0.1526 0.0749 -0.2355 -0.1281 -0.1064 -0.1651 0.3405 -0.0451 -0.075 -0.0209 -0.1228 -0.0237 0.0562 -0.0981 -0.1108
VILLAGE -0.0158 0.1309 -0.066 -0.0335 -0.0448 -0.0695 0.0823 0.0545 -0.0316 -0.0088 -0.0535 -0.0197 0.1481 -0.0413 -0.0467
ALB 0.4032 -0.1541 0.6735 0.4358 0.2885 0.192 -0.1065 -0.3995 -0.0031 0.0775 0.6917 0.1144 -0.4504 0.2304 -0.1064
LLR 0.9121 0.036 0.4629 0.9058 0.416 -0.2725 0.1072 -0.1455 -0.0774 0.0354 0.2489 0.0434 -0.1838 0.2181 0.1764
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Appendix table A (continued): Correlation table 
 GROUP VILLAGE ALB LLR 
 
    
GROUP 1    
VILLAGE -0.0263 1   
ALB -0.2563 -0.128 1  
LLR -0.1514 -0.0671 0.3919 1 
 
